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Ancient philosophy models non-living processes in 
terms of living beings; modern science and 
philosophy reverses this priority by conceiving the 
living as evolving from the non-living. Recent work 
in science and philosophy questions that reversal, by 
emphasizing how living beings are self-organizing, 
active agencies.  But in the contemporary context we 
would need a new concept of nature to follow 
through on this reversal, to fit self-organizing 
organisms with nature as a whole.  
A study of the themes of structure, expression and 
sense across Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy opens a 
way toward this new concept.  Points from Bergson 
and Hegel lead to a concept of expression as a 
movement that creates new possibility.  Results from 
immunology and evolutionary cellular biology let us 
detect such a movement of sense in nature. This gives 
a model for thinking of nature as a whole as an 
expressive, living movement—for thinking of the law 
of the non-living as the visible outgrowth of an 
invisible expressive movement of the universe. 
 
In ancient philosophy, life is primary.1  For 
example, for Aristotle, moving, growing 
organisms are exemplary of substance and 
movement, central terms of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics and physics.2  The non-living is 
made intelligible on the model of the living.  
But modern skepticism wears down all 
appeal to an outside intelligibility, and 
remodels the outer world on the inner light 
of reason.  Given the tools and procedures 
with which modern scientific reason begins, 
the fundamental terms in the new models 
end up being static, inert.3  The living is 
thus made intelligible on the model of the 
non-living. 
The reversal from the primacy of the 
living to the primacy of the non-living is 
made feasible by Darwin and the modern 
evolutionary synthesis.  In his magisterial 
analysis, The Structure of Evolutionary 
Theory, Stephen Jay Gould notes that prior 
to Darwin, biologists had recognized 
adaptation via natural selection, but took this 
process as only being able to discard already 
given organic forms: natural selection can 
improve by weeding out, but cannot create 
biological form.  Darwin’s central 
accomplishment is giving a convincing 
account of how a non-creative process of 
natural selection can, over a very long time, 
granted mechanisms of inherited variation, 
be creative of biological form.4  The modern 
synthesis shows how genetics is at the basis 
of heritable variation, and thereby finds a 
way of understanding the living as the 
historical outcome of non-creative processes 
that can be understood chemically.  The 
living is thus rooted in the non-living.   
But the reversal overshoots and goes 
back in the direction of the living.  The 
effort of reducing biological form to a 
product of genetics in fact convinces 
scientists that genetic information is not 
enough to specify organic form.  The 
patterns of leaf organization that pervade the 
plant world, for example, do not simply or 
ultimately point to a genetically encoded 
pattern common to and inherited by all 
plants, but to a common morphogenetic 
process: tensions inherent in the structured 
dynamics of plant growth, not mere 
genetics, generate the basic patterns of leaf 
organization.  Likewise with the bone 
structure of vertebrate limbs.5  The usual 
tendency of physics and science is to 
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construe living beings as special and rare 
cases to be understood in terms of more 
general physical systems; in contrast, Robert 
Rosen has argued that understanding living 
beings as physical systems requires a new 
sort of physical formalism that emphasizes 
relations, rather than entities; he has worked 
out this formalism in detail, and within it, it 
is the non-living that is special and rare, 
since non-living entities are conceived as 
closed and static systems to be isolated 
within larger, self-organizing, open 
systems.6  Indeed, in contemporary science 
and philosophy, activity and agency, relation 
and process, crop up everywhere, displacing 
passive matter and abstract law.7  And in 
Manuel Delanda’s recent reconstruction of 
Deleuze, contra the modern injunction that 
reason is only truly manifest to the 
interiority of subjectivity, we find an 
intelligibility that creates itself in movement, 
an intelligibility that is not interior to reason 
but is in things themselves, what I shall call 
an intelligibility of the outside.8  Maxine 
Sheets-Johnstone’s insistence on an 
intelligibility within animate form echoes 
this intelligibility of the outside.9  These 
scientists and philosophers swing us back in 
Aristotle’s direction.  Both the living and the 
non-living make themselves intelligible as 
self-organizing processes—processes 
exemplified by the living but also found in 
the non-living.  But in the age of 
technological reason, of calculable, 
controllable nature, it seems all too 
outrageous to think of nature not as 
clockwork but as life-like. How are we to 
think this?   
In this paper I want to indicate how 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of expression 
can be a resource for rethinking nature and 
life.  In the first sections I briefly indicate 
the role of self-organization and expression 
across Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. In the 
second section I link expression to 
movement. The link between expression and 
movement opens the way for  some 
suggestions, in the final section, about how 
nature as a whole involves expressive 
movement and is in this sense living.  
My conceptual explorations are 
motivated by Renaud Barbaras’s indication, 
in “The Movement of the Living as the 
Originary Foundation of Perceptual 
Intentionality,” that reconciling the 
phenomenon of life with nature would 
require a new way of thinking nature, not a 
reduction of living movement to nature as 
typically conceived by the physicist.10  They 
are also inspired by Maxine Sheets-
Johnstone’s turn to animate movement.11
1. Structure, expression and sense in 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy 
Very often the effort of putting Merleau-
Ponty’s works together is organized around 
their chronology, in which case his 
conceptual advances seem to accumulate in 
a break between an earlier and later 
Merleau-Ponty.  But it would equally be 
possible to grasp his works as cohering 
around a single problem, which I call the 
problem of structure, sense and 
expression.12  The Structure of Behaviour 
discovers this problem by arguing that a 
science of behaviour is possible only if there 
is structure.13  As we shall see, the concept 
of structure raises the problem of perception, 
the beginning point of the 
Phenomenology.14  The Phenomenology 
argues that perceptual experience is possible 
only if there is a pre-personal sense 
expressed in gesture, the body, words, etc.  
This concept provokes a rather Bergsonian 
difficulty: how can philosophy speak of a 
pre-personal sense?  In trying to speak of the 
pre-personal, is not philosophy rather like a 
ventriloquist who insists that really, it is the 
dummy who is doing the talking?  The 
Visible and the Invisible begins with this 
problem and tries to solve it by re-installing 
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philosophical interrogation in being, thus 
showing how, indeed, being is not dumb but 
itself foreshadows sense and philosophical 
interrogation.15  Returning interrogation and 
sense to being requires concepts such as 
chiasm, dehiscence, reversibility and écart, 
which amount to radical new ways of 
grasping expression and sense as going all 
the way down to the roots of being, rather 
than understanding expression and sense as 
subsequent, subjective impositions on 
being—the Cartesian position.  Put this way, 
Merleau-Ponty’s stated problem with his 
early work, that it wrongly persists in 
starting from the consciousness-object 
division, is really a symptom of a deeper 
problem, namely a failure to locate structure 
and sense in being itself.16  Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy thus sets him the task of rooting 
expression in nature—and it is precisely 
because of this that his philosophy can be a 
resource for rethinking life and nature.    
To give a better indication of this 
approach to Merleau-Ponty and the problem 
of expression and nature, let me briefly 
return to The Structure of Behaviour and the 
Phenomenology.  Structure shows how the 
extremes of idealism and realism fail to 
grasp the phenomenon of behaviour.  The 
way out is structure, “the joining of an idea 
and an existence which are indiscernible, the 
contingent arrangement by which materials 
begin to have sense in our presence, 
intelligibility in the nascent state.”17  In 
other words, in structures Merleau-Ponty 
finds an intelligibility of the outside.  But if 
there is to be an intelligibility in things, then 
things must be what we would now call self-
organizing.  This phenomenon is familiar in 
the vital and human orders: organisms 
construct their own norms over the life-time 
of species; language and other cultural 
objects organize new meaning over 
individual lifetimes.  But crucially, in 
Structure Merleau-Ponty also conceives the 
physical order as self-organizing.  For 
example, in a detailed analysis of what he 
calls “dynamic structure” Merleau-Ponty 
argues that “elements or particles” are not 
invested with “absolute properties”; they do 
not form structures because of already 
specified “intersecting…linear causal 
series.”  Rather, it is because particles form 
a ““molar” individual”” that their laws 
“express” a structure, and the laws and 
properties of particles are intelligible only 
within structures.  So “science must be 
linked to a history of the universe in which 
the development is discontinuous,” that is, 
nature is not the unwinding of already 
specified laws, but a development 
punctuated by the creation of new sorts of 
individual collectivities (SdC 148-9/138-40).  
When studying these passages in Structure, 
it is hard not to see an anticipation of some 
aspects of recent science and Deleuzian 
philosophy.18   
But Merleau-Ponty diverges from 
Deleuzianism because he argues that “form 
is not a physical reality, but an object of 
perception” (SdC  155/143).  At this point, 
careful study of Structure reveals a crucial 
tension within Merleau-Ponty.  On the one 
hand, since form, or structure, is an object of 
perception, nature must expand to include 
the human order in which perception and 
language express the implicit, nascent sense 
of structure, which means that nature itself 
must have a sense, there must be an 
intelligibility of the outside.19  On the other 
hand, despite Merleau-Ponty’s tendency in 
Structure, perhaps learned from Bergson, to 
question anthropomorphic interpretations of 
concepts20, structure only becomes fully 
explicit when expressed in a human 
language that has an autonomous sense.  
And, as we know, since the reality of 
structure is in perception, The Structure of 
Behaviour ends with a call for a study of 
perception.  In other words, in resolving the 
ontological problem of structure—of how 
there can be a dynamic, self-organizing 
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sense in nature—there is a tension between 
localizing expression and sense within the 
human order, and rooting expression, sense 
and the human order in a nature that itself 
has sense.  
The Phenomenology of Perception 
only deepens this tension.  In rejecting the 
ready-made world and transcendental 
consciousness, Merleau-Ponty once again 
turns to something like structure, to a 
meaning nascent in the world.  He finds this 
meaning by discovering a new sort of sense 
within gesture, by discovering the body 
schema, in short, by discovering that bodily 
movements in the world have a pervasively 
self-organizing character that already has (or 
is) a pre-personal sense.  But once again, 
expression—the body as expressive, 
perception as expressive, language as 
expressive—are central in bringing this pre-
personal sense to light.  To take this back to 
the beginning of the Phenomenology, sense 
is not introjected into the world by a free 
floating transcendental consciousness, rather 
the perceiver inheres in a transcendental 
field and sense arises within this field.  Here 
I am drawing on Leonard Lawlor’s work on 
expression21, which work reminds us that 
for Merleau-Ponty the sense of the 
transcendental field arises in “a creative 
operation which itself participates in the 
facticity of…experience.” (PhP 74/61)  This 
creation of sense within non-sense, of 
structure, is nothing other than primary 
expression.22 Sense, expression and 
structure thus entwine within the 
transcendental field.  And Lawlor shows 
how the balance between Merleau-Ponty 
and Deleuze hangs on the question of how 
expression is “anticipated” in the 
“unreflective experience” from which the 
transcendental field arises—Merleau-Ponty 
can escape the Deleuzian criticism only if 
the relation between sense and non-sense is 
immanent within the field, rather than in 
subjectivity.   
Put otherwise, Merleau-Ponty opens 
the question how can there already be a 
sense in nature, rather than in the subject 
merely, a question he pursues in the Visible 
and the Invisible.  But here I want to pursue 
this question by drawing a connection 
between expression and movement via the 
Phenomenology.  
2. Expression as Movement  
Bernard Waldenfels’s article “The Paradox 
of Expression” exposes the paradoxical core 
of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of expression.23  
By juxtaposing Merleau-Ponty with 
Deleuze, Leonard Lawlor’s article “The End 
of Phenomenology: Expressionism in 
Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze”  helps sharpen 
this paradox.  For Deleuze, “[t]he paradox is 
that at once ‘the expressed’ does not exist 
outside of the expression and yet bears no 
resemblance to it”  (Lawlor, 17).  As Lawlor 
shows, what is ontologically at stake in 
Deleuze’s expressionism is a ground that 
“must never borrow characteristics from 
what it grounds,” that “must presuppose 
nothing of what it engenders.”  (Lawlor, 22)  
But this paradoxical ground is definitive of 
primary expression in Merleau-Ponty: I am 
trying to find words that would express what 
I am trying to think, yet what I am trying to 
think is not at all clear until I express 
myself; the silence prior to expression does 
not contain the expression that it engenders.  
What ends up being expressed stems from 
an engendering silence, yet bears no 
resemblance to it.  This kind of expression, 
which Merleau-Ponty calls primary 
expression, is a fundamentally creative 
operation.  (In the rest of the paper, primary 
expression is the sole concern.)  
Empirically, the phenomenon of 
expression is obviously a phenomenon of 
movement, since it involves making a mark 
in the world, and that requires a change of 
place, quality, quantity or something new 
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coming into being, movement in Aristotle’s 
sense.24  But I want to suggest a deeper, 
ontological affinity between expression and 
movement.  Here are my reasons, which 
stem from the peculiar logic of expression.  
1) Expression is a relation between 
moments of one continuous expression. Yet 
this relation is not one of resemblance, since 
the continuity of expression is punctuated by  
discontinuity, by the creation of a difference.  
So expression involves what Bergson would 
call transference of a state25, a real 
movement.  Put another way, the beginning 
and end of expression do not have the sort of 
identity of mathematical points that can be 
translated onto one another within an 
already defined plane.  To draw once again 
on Bergson, the beginning and end of 
expression are juxtaposed in the manner of a 
child and the adult she becomes.  The adult 
is not something other than the child, yet 
does not resemble the child, since the child 
does not contain the adult.  The beginning 
and end of expression are not related by a 
mechanical translation within a plane, but by 
a creative movement that transforms the 
plane from within.  As Merleau-Ponty puts 
it, expression creates the inner text that it 
translates.26  The creative ‘translation’ we 
are talking about here is the sort of 
“bouleversement” of the child learning the 
difference between red and blue (PhP 
38/30), the sort of creative operation that 
elaborates the transcendental field (PhP 
74/61).  What goes on in expression is what 
goes on in a real movement. 
2) A similar point follows from the 
Bergsonian and Merleau-Ponteian claim that 
real movement is a whole irreducible to its 
parts.  In a peculiar way, to become a 
beginning, the beginning of a movement has 
to wait for the whole of movement.  When I 
wander out the front door, my steps are not 
really the beginning of a walk until I wind 
up back at home after having taken a walk; 
at a given moment I could decide to dance 
or go to the café, in which case my initial 
steps would not have been the beginning of 
a walk.  The point that the beginning of the 
movement must wait for the whole of 
movement is much clearer in gesture: the 
beginning of a gesture is not yet really the 
beginning of a gesture until it unfurls in 
gestural expression.  Even though a 
movement is a continuous whole, or 
precisely because it can only be a whole, 
there is a peculiar discontinuity between the 
moments of movement and the movement as 
a whole.  This is just the sort of paradoxical 
relation we find between the expressed and 
the expression.  
So far I have been trying to show an 
affinity between the ontology of movement 
and the peculiar logic of expression.  But I 
want to go further in making sense of 
expression as movement.  There would be a 
way of doing this phenomenologically27, but 
I want to head in an ontological direction. 
To do that I wrest a clue from Hegel’s 
Science of Logic, in light of Bergson’s link 
between movement and possibility. 
(Bergson is behind both Merleau-Ponty and 
Deleuze, as is Hegel, via Hyppolite.)  The 
clue stems from Hegel’s demonstration that 
abandoning the logic of transcendental 
reflection—Merleau-Ponty’s radical project 
in criticizing the ready-made world—
requires finding a ground that does not 
borrow from what it grounds, and this in 
turn requires a rethinking of the possible. (I 
leave the details to a note about this clue.28)  
If existence does not reflect a transcendental 
essence, then existence must actualize itself, 
that is, reflect its own possibilities.  But if 
we think of possibility as a ready-made 
storehouse waiting to be unpacked, we turn 
possibility into a new version of 
transcendental essence.  Here Hegel and 
Bergson converge in urging us to think of 
actuality as somehow productive of 
possibilities that enable new actualities.  
Bergson pursues this productive operation in 
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terms of durée and creation.29  Hegel tries to 
grasp this operation as self-mediating, and 
calls it concept, what conceives itself, which 
Hyppolite (in Logique et existence) calls 
sense.  The clue, finally, is that sense 
emerges and is found in processes that 
involve the actualization and the creation of 
possibility, as co-implicated in one another.   
To give an example, when Joyce 
writes Finnegans Wake he does not just 
actualize existing possibilities of English, he 
re-possibilizes English and finds new 
actualities within this re-possibilization, the 
one by way of the other.  Joyce begins with 
possibilities that are as it were ‘stored’ in 
actual English, but in writing the Wake, he 
opens new possibilities unanticipated in 
“English as she is spoke.”30  He does this 
only by not actualizing other heretofore 
unanticipated possibilities. It becomes 
significant that, for example, Joyce writes 
“[a]s we there are,” rather than “[a]s we 
there am”—although neither sentence 
belongs to the ‘store’ of already possible 
English sense.  The actualization of an 
unanticipated possibility is also the non-
actualization of another, different 
unanticipated possibility; each new 
expression that Joyce develops at the edge 
of English is enhaloed by other expressions 
that are not even expressed.  Each of Joyce’s 
actualizations of what had not yet been 
possible in English thus does two things: it 
creates a new possibility by actualizing it for 
the first time; and it delimits the space of 
possibility within which the new possibility 
is actualized, by contrasting the new 
possibility with further possibilities that are 
not even not-actualized.  (The complexity of 
this point stems from difficulties and 
insufficiencies of our usual concepts of 
actuality and possibility.31) This process, 
which I call re-possibilization, is not a 
movement into unexplored realms of an 
already existing storehouse of possibility, it 
is a movement of actualizing that 
reconfigures possibility by having actuality 
move toward a new outside in a way that 
diverges from a ‘road not taken.’ Novel 
sense is created by divergence from its 
ground in its own non-sense.  
The connection between sense and the 
possible invites a characterization of 
expression as movement, which will help 
clarify the point just made.  The science of 
information theory conceives information as 
the elimination of possibilities; the code for 
the letter “B” in an email is information 
because it eliminates the other 255 possible 
characters that could be there; the email 
“BUY IBM” is information so far as it 
eliminates the possibility of buying AT&T, 
and so on.  Email moves electrons so as to 
coordinate possibility elimination across 
space and time.  Clearly this sort of 
possibility elimination is what Merleau-
Ponty calls secondary expression.  But 
suppose somebody emails you Finnegans 
Wake.  What the hell does it mean?  Joyce’s 
language contrasts itself with possibilities 
that had not yet been considered; in his work 
the creation and elimination of possibilities 
are thoroughly blended.  This is what is 
distinctive of primary expression as a 
movement: at one and the same time it 
verges into new moving possibilities and 
restricts them.32  Repeating a standard 
gesture is a secondary expression that 
communicates information by not being 
another gesture in an existing repertoire.  In 
contrast, a spontaneous gesture is a primary 
expression of new sense because it at once 
and constantly verges toward newly possible 
movements, yet does not pursue them.  It 
develops a trajectory within a movement 
space it itself creates.  Think of a child 
inventing a dance: she does not have a space 
of possible movement in mind in advance, 
rather her actual movements at once decide 
a new way of moving and indicate moves 
not taken, moves that had not even been 
suggested as explicit possibilities in advance 
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of her actual movements.  The sense of the 
dance arises as it were in the wake of 
movement, in its divergence away from 
movements not-even-taken.  And perhaps 
this phenomenon of sense arising in the 
divergence of movement is what Merleau-
Ponty means to indicate by écart. 
3. Expressive Nature, Living Nature 
It is easy enough to see how expressive 
movement belongs to the human order.  The 
question that the entirety of Merleau-Ponty’s 
work leaves us with is whether such 
expressive movement, as it has here been 
conceived, arises in nature itself.  
I am going to say it does.  The 
vertebrate immunological system 
distinguishes between organism and 
invaders.  But according to immunology this 
system is not a machine for checking 
biological tags against a fixed library of 
possible pathogens; rather it is a network of 
recursive interactions that continually 
creates a distinction between self and other.  
The immune system learns, and this means 
that contact with a novel pathogen must at 
once open a new space of possible 
responses, and restrict responses.  The 
immune system does not just eliminate fixed 
possibilities, it actualizes itself by re-
possibilizing its movements.33  The immune 
system encountering something beyond its 
limits as a pathogen is, in a way, akin to 
Joyce encountering something beyond the 
limits of English as having a new sense 
within English.  In this way, as Merleau-
Ponty might put it, the immune system 
expresses the sense of self.34  To give 
another example, evolutionary theory no 
longer takes the reproduction and 
individuality of multicelluar organisms for 
granted, it seeks their explanation.  
According to the scientist Leo Buss, 
multicellular reproduction and individuality 
are counterpart phenomena.  At a certain 
point in evolution, cilia, moving fibres, 
diverge in function: some move to the 
outside of cells, where they can move the 
cell in the environment; some move to the 
inside, where they can move the inner 
environment in preparation for reproduction. 
To get a multicellular creature that both 
reproduces and moves around, what is 
required is a cluster in which exterior cells 
with outside cilia do the moving and inner 
cells with inside cilia do the reproducing. 
This divergence between exterior and 
interior cilia within one creature entails a 
divergence between developmental layers, 
the division of the organism into inner and 
outward layers; this division serves as the 
template for the developmental structure and 
corresponding strata of cellular 
specialization familiar in earthly 
multicellular creatures, especially the 
divergence between germ and somatic cell 
lines, which is crucial to our sense of the 
individuality of multicellular creatures.35  
Again, this crucial development does not 
follow from stored up possibilities; it 
actualizes itself by creating a new space of 
diverging possible movements for cilia—
and divergences of inner and outer layers, 
structures and cell lines follow. 
The case of the multicellular organism 
shows how something like expression-as-
movement happens in the living.  But does it 
happen in what we consider non-living?  
Another living example will help us pursue 
this question. A given, individual bird comes 
to migrate from one place to another only by 
following birds that already know crucial 
landmarks.  A given bird in an established 
migration thus picks up information from 
the birds it follows (go this way, not that). 
But if we ask how a population of birds 
learns its migratory path for the first time, 
we find sense, not information; some birds 
had to venture forth, re-possibilizing 
movement by actualizing just some new 
movement possibilities.  In the lifetime of an 
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individual bird, the migratory path manifests 
a fixed route between already established 
points, and learning it means learning 
information.  But in the lifetime of the flock, 
the path is learnt by creating it, the flock-
movement creates a sense that is originally 
expressed…. and then expressed again in 
seasonal movement patterns.   
Now imagine that the universe is like 
that, that space, time and laws do not 
manifest fixed routes of reality, but are the 
creation of a flock of movements over the 
single, long season of the universe.  Imagine 
that space is not the inflation of an already 
established bubble of space, in which case 
we would end up with the logical difficulty 
of needing some prior space-time in which 
to conceive this inflation as happening.  
Imagine that space is what happens when 
certain swarms of movement migrate one 
after another, creating and actualizing 
possibilities.  Conceive, if you will, that law, 
space and time, are not a causal container 
for movements, but the product of a prior 
kind of migratory movement, a migratory 
movement which could not be understood 
“extensively” in terms of a prior space and 
time, but “intensively.”  
What does this mean?  In the Structure 
of Behaviour Merleau-Ponty wrote that 
“science must be linked to a history of the 
universe in which the development is 
discontinuous.”  (SdC  150/139)  I am 
arguing that this discontinuity is precisely 
what we find in expressive movement that at 
once opens and actualizes possibility, in 
which there is a peculiar identity yet 
discontinuity between the moments of 
movement and the whole of the movement.  
As Bergson might put it, time does make a 
difference, discontinuity introduces 
novelty—only here I want to talk about 
expressive movement, rather than time.  But 
what does it mean to think of a universe in 
which expressive movement makes a 
difference?  Earlier I said that The Structure 
of Behaviour leads us to think of organisms 
as organizing norms over the lifetime of the 
species, and humans as organizing new 
meanings over individual lifetimes—and 
Merleau-Ponty calls this organizing 
“expression.”  We are beginning to think of 
the universe not as the unfolding of a system 
whose law would already have been 
specified, but rather as a process the 
beginning and development of which makes 
a difference in the way that the beginning 
and development of a life or expression 
makes a difference.  In short, we are led to 
think of the universe as organizing and 
expressing its intelligibility over a singular 
lifetime.  To be more concrete, in the first 
corollary to the third law of motion 
Newton36 proves that a body acted on by 
two forces describes the diagonal of the 
parallelogram that would be described by 
the two forces acting separately.  We have to 
ask: Why does this proof work?  Why is the 
universe susceptible to decomposition along 
lines we find intelligible?  Is it because of an 
absolute space-time-law that would already 
specify such intelligibility?  No, it is because 
the universe grows to express such an 
intelligibility. In following this line of 
thinking, life, at least expressive movement, 
once again becomes primary in modelling 
the intelligibility of the universe.   
To put it another way, the emphasis on 
activity, agency and self-organization in 
current science, mentioned at the beginning 
of this paper, would seem to demand a 
conceptual reversal in which the expressive 
movement of the universe is primary, and 
natural law is secondary.  Why? Accounting 
for activity, agency and self-organization in 
terms of the primacy of an already specified 
natural law leads to a double conceptual 
problem. First, conceiving activity, agency 
and self-organization in this way turns them 
into epiphenomenal, passive results of law, 
which is inconsistent with conceiving such 
phenomena as active, self-organizing 
8 
agencies. Second, if natural law is primary, 
then we need an account of the ontology and 
origin of the law, and of the relation 
between law and that of which it is the law.  
If, instead, active self-organization is 
considered primary, if natural law is 
conceived as an epiphenomenon of a prior 
movement, or, to put in terms of Merleau-
Ponty’s Structure, if we conceive law as a 
phenomenon expressed by natural process, 
then the second problem can be resolved, 
and the first problem is no longer a problem 
(because active, self-organizing process is 
primary).  The living once again gives us a 
model of this sort of relation between a 
process and a law expressed by that process.  
In How the Leopard Changed Its Spots, 
Brian Goodwin observes that in higher 
plants, we find only three basic 
arrangements of leaves on stems. One might 
think that these arrangements are determined 
by a law fixed in advance of plant growth by 
a genetic program, but Goodwin argues that 
they are the outcome of tensions inherent in 
plant growth: growth stresses the outer skin 
of the plant, and budding is, as it were, the 
resolution of these stresses; the regular 
arrangement of leaves on stems is a trace of 
resolving a stress pattern endogenous to a 
plant’s growth in its environment.37  The 
arrangement of leaves is not the outcome of 
a fixed law, it expresses the serial rhythm of 
internal stresses.  We make a mistake if we 
take the law visibly manifest in the final 
arrangement of leaves as an abstract control 
mechanism built-in and governing leaf 
arrangement from the start; rather, the law 
visible in the grown plant is the expression 
of a growth process, even if the details of 
that self-organizing growth are invisible to 
unaided perception.  Likewise, I suggest, 
with the universe: natural law is the visible 
expression of a growth process, the self-
organization of which is invisible.  
A crucial question thus arises: Why is 
the living movement of the universe, its 
‘growth’, invisible?  To add one last 
controversial thought to the ones above, it is 
because the universe is for us more like an 
animal than a plant.  When a plant grows we 
see limbs and organs unfold along a line of 
growth, but when we watch, for example, a 
mammal growing we only see development 
in size, completion and behaviour—changes 
in degree, not kind.38  We see qualitative 
change in the growth of plants because their 
gestation from seed is visible to us, while 
that of the animal is invisible.  The gestation 
of our universe is even more invisible to us, 
even though its trace is visible in all things.  
We are like the botanist who realizes that the 
pattern of leaves in the plant cannot be 
modelled in terms of the framework now 
visible in the plant, as that framework is 
understood by the botanist; rather, the 
pattern must be modelled in terms of the 
living growth that gives rise to it.  While the 
botanist can make botanic growth processes 
visible, through empirical study and 
conceptual reconstruction of it, this is not 
empirically possible with the universe as a 
whole, and much more difficult 
conceptually, because the growth of the 
universe gives rise to all of entities and 
relations that would be part of our 
conceptual reconstruction of it. Indeed, our 
tendency is to make the invisible of the 
universe all too continuous with the universe 
now visible.  For example, we reify 
presently manifest law and take it as a 
template for explanation that can be 
projected back into the inception of the 
universe.  When we model the invisible of 
the universe on non-living processes that are 
so visible to us now, the discontinuities that 
give rise to the visible spatio-temporal-
lawful continuity of our universe are 
invisible to us.  What I am saying instead is 
that the invisible of the visible intelligibility 
of the universe is to be modelled on 
movement that generates its own 
9 
discontinuity—and this sort of expressive 
movement is characteristic of the living. 
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